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Abstract: 
Purpose: With the rapid progress of Internet of Things technology, the information service of 
IoT has got unprecedented development, and plays an increasingly important role in real life. 
For the increasing demand of information service, the pricing of information service becomes 
more important. This paper aims to analyze the strategic options and payoff function between 
information provider and intermediaries based on Stackelberg game. Firstly, we describe 
information service delivery method based on the Internet of Things specific function. 
Secondly, we calculate the consumer demand for the information service. Finally, we explain 
two kinds of strategic options by the game theory, and then discuss the optimal pricing method 
of information services based on profit maximization. 
Design/methodology/approach: To achieve this objective, Considering the consumer 
perceived value of Internet of Things Service changing, we establish a Stackelberg model in 
which the supplier is the leader followed by the middleman. Then, we compare the advantages 
of using individual pricing with that of bundling pricing.  
Findings: The results show that whether information providers adopt bundling pricing strategy 
or individual pricing strategy depends on the cost of perception equipment, if information 
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providers want to adopt individual pricing strategy, the variation of consumers’ perception value 
of information services must meet certain conditions. 
     Research limitations/implications: the providers make price for the information service, in 
addition to continuously improve the quality of information service, it also devotes resources to 
tapping and understanding market information, such as the sensor device price, the variation of 
perception value of information services and so on, so as to create competitive advantage. This 
paper is just a preliminary model, it does not take into account the effect of mixed bundling. 
     Originality/value: In this research, a new model for price information service with the game 
theory is proposed. To the authors' knowledge, it is the first time to study the pricing of 
information service with the game theory, It discuss the impact of consumers’ perceived value 
for the equipment of internet of things on pricing strategy, and it also analyze the impaction of 
consumers’ perceived value for information service on pricing strategy, the research shows that 
the information providers should take different strategies based on the specific situations to 
maximize the profit on the information service market of the IOT. 
Keywords: Internet of  things; Individual pricing; Bundling pricing; Services pricing 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The 12th Five-Year Plan of China has clearly stated that Internet of Things should be developed to 
be a strategic emerging industry and promote its application in some important areas, 
highlighting  that Internet of Things have been improved to the national strategic level. With the 
application of Internet of Things technology in the service industry, the pricing of information 
services cannot be avoided. What’s more, the pricing of Internet of Things (IOT) is an important 
part to introduce information services into market. How to determine an appropriate pricing 
scheme which service providers, intermediaries and consumers are willing to accept, this makes 
pricing of Internet of things information service become a hotspot nowadays. 
 
Why information services should be pricing for the IOT have got lots of attention in the literatures. 
Eva considers information as the main source for value proposition based on “economic value 
creation” theory, and uses the information law to prove his conclusion, then, proposing that 
pricing is an important step for introducing information service to the market. In addition (Eva & 
Dieter, 2010), Elgar put IOT technology into use in the transportation, and analyses the users and 
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businessmen’s benefits, consequently he finds out that IOT can reduce transaction costs and 
market risks, then attempts to propose the appropriate market structure and pricing mechanisms 
which makes the business model successfully applied based on sensor service (Elgar, 2010). Jens 
applies the market design and pricing mechanism to the IOT, pointed the important participations 
in the internet of things service market, which includes consumers, intermediaries and 
information service providers. At the same time he gives the necessary steps to establish this 
kind of market (Jens & Christoph, 2009). Wang and Yan analyse the application demands and 
industry driven effects of IOT, and indicates that the pricing of information service is the problem 
needed to be solved with the information service of IOT spread in use (Wang & Yan, 2010). Chen 
confirms that information service of IOT is one of the most application forms of economic value, 
pointing the operators’ role in the process of information service (Chen & Han, 2010). 
Furthermore, Zhang points out that when promoting information services related to pricing, 
operators should integrate the advantages of resources and develops differentiated service 
(Zhang, 2010). IOT will provide location independent, interoperable, scalable, secure, and 
efficient access to a coordinated set of services, so we should adopt to a reasonable pricing to 
develop IOT. Theodore and Trakadas consider IOT are quickly gaining popularity due to the fact 
that can be used in a variety of application areas, the issue of privacy protection is as important 
as secure and reliable functioning of a network (Theodore & Trakadas, 2009). 
 
Some scholars make further studies for how to price in the IOT based on the above literatures, 
Michael and Markus apply IOT technology to the automobile insurance in order to ensure that the 
service pricing is based on actual driving risk, but do not represent the appropriate model. The 
result is mainly qualitative description but lacking of a quantitative support (Michael & Markus, 
2010). Christian and Martin concentrate on the technology applied into the supply chain, and puts 
forward a model of smart equipment costs from a quantitative point of view, treated the variation 
of technology prices, consumer utility and the fixed cost as parameters to assess income changes 
of providers, consumers and shippers, and finally provides pricing strategies for pricing makers 
(Christian & Martin, 2010). Gerd, Kawsar, Fitton and Vasughi think an activity-aware smart object 
analyzes the data stream from its sensors, uses recognition algorithms to detect activities and 
events, and applies application-specific aggregation functions. So the discussion of usage-based 
pricing policies for smart products appears elsewhere (Gerd et al., 2010). Sun introduce a real 
case of Internet of Things called ZB IoT, It combines the Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) with 
EPC global standards in the system design, cited an example of how to pricing for the IOT (Sun & 
Aersriten, 2010). Gao and Liang built a structural equation model of the internet of things, and 
the results showed that the consumers’ potential demand for the internet of things was 
determined by their willingness and affordability，their willingness was determined by their 
perceived usefulness and perceived value (Gao & Liang, 2012). Although it involves the pricing 
problem in his paper, it ignores the incomplete information conditions and market competition. 
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From the above studies, we can see the articles applying the game theory to price information 
service are rare. This paper aims to analyze the strategic options and payoff function between 
information provider and intermediaries based on Stackelberg game. Firstly, we describe 
information service delivery method based on the Internet of Things specific function. Secondly, 
we calculate the consumer demand for the information service. Finally, we explain two kinds of 
strategic options by the game theory, and then discuss the optimal pricing method of information 
services based on profit maximization.  
 
2. The Basic Model 
2.1. Model Setting 
1
2 3
4
6 5Consumer
Information 
providers
Physical 
world
Intermediaries
 
Figure 1. The delivery routine of information service in the IOT 
 
In the IOT market, it involves three entities when selling information services: information 
providers, intermediaries and consumers. Bundling is the first choice when selling sensor 
information to consumers. Throughout the whole economy activities, the consumer passively 
accepts the price. As shown in Figure 1, we can find out that the consumer firstly sends the 
information request to intermediaries, and then the intermediaries obtain basic information 
through the deployment of intelligent sensor node to the physical world. Furthermore, 
information providers integrate and process this physical information. Finally, the final 
information could be fed back to consumers by the verse routine. In the information services 
market, services fee that are charged by consumers is consist of two parts: expense paid to the 
information providers and that to intermediaries. Therefore, the relationship between 
intermediaries and information providers will affect the results of bundling pricing (Zhang & Tang, 
2008). In order to better analyze the problem, the participants are limited as follow: 
 
Consumer 
When consumers use the information provided by the IOT, the scene information has to be 
obtained by the perception equipment. Only when a wealth of information are aggregated 
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together through a variety of sensors and labels for identification, perception, then coordinate 
with each other, can IOT provide a full real-time coverage and time-sensitive information services, 
and can consumers get information about location, environment at any place. In order to 
effectively solve the problem of information service pricing, this article adds the cost of the sensor 
equipment to elaborate the effect of information services pricing. It assumes that the consumers’ 
reservation utility function is V(RE,pe). Parameter RE is the consumers’ evaluation value of the 
information services in an ideal condition, the value obeys a certain probability distribution, the 
density function is f(RE) and distribution function is F(RE). Parameter pe is the expenditure of 
perception equipment paid by consumers when enjoying the information services. Perception 
equipment and the required information have a complementary relationship with each other. In 
addition, parameter RE and parameter pe are not relevant with each other. Only when RE> pe, 
consumers will purchase the equipment, so the consumers reservation utility function can be 
expressed as: V(RE,pe)=RE-pe. 
 
Intermediaries 
Intermediaries provide market platform for connect information providers and consumers. 
Intermediaries are charged to consumers based on flow. This article supposes the price of per unit 
flow is pi and each size of information services (bytes) is also the same. It takes an average time 
t on each information services for consumers. Profits from each service to intermediaries can be 
described as pit. Considering intermediaries providing distribution channels and marketing 
platforms, we assume that the marginal cost of transmission is zero. 
 
Information providers 
In the IOT Information services market, information providers supply N(N>2) kinds of different 
information services to consumers with zero marginal cost. There are two sales models: 
individual pricing and bundling pricing. In the individual pricing strategy, the unit price for 
information services is pc. While in the bundling pricing, the price for the information service 
package is pb. Information providers select a different sales model through the maximize profit 
principle, and thus making different prices for information services.  
 
2.2 Model Establishment 
 
When the information providers adopt different strategies, behaviors of consumers are different, 
so the demands of information services are also not similar with each other. When the 
information providers adopt bundling pricing strategy, for the intermediaries charge to 
consumers based on flow, if consumers spend a piece of information service, the fee paid 
to intermediaries is pit, and the consumer surplus can be expressed as: 
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c E e c iCS R p p p t                                          (1) 
 
Only when CSc>0, consumers will spend on information services, so: 
  
tpppR iceE                                             (2) 
 
Then the corresponding demand function is: 
 
)(1)( tpppFdRRfd iceE
tppp
Ec
ice
 


             (3) 
 
When consumer needs N pieces different information services, due to adopting bundling pricing 
strategy, customers need to purchase them in N kinds of different markets to, so the 
total demand for information services is Dc=Ndc.                                 
 
In order to facilitate the game analysis between intermediaries and information providers, we 
assume the consumers’ evaluation of information services RE subjected to uniform distribution 
on[0,R] in an ideal situation, so: 
 
)1(
R
tppp
ND icec


                                   (4) 
 
Under the condition of individual pricing strategy, when customers want to consume one or more 
pieces services in N information services package, they must purchase the 
entire information services package, consumers’ utility evaluation to the information 
service package will be affected by the correlation of service (Venkatesh & Wagner, 2003), so the 
demand of service package market is not the sum of N kinds of market requirements. The 
consumers’ total evaluation of information service pack is NRE+V. Compared with N kinds of 
items for sale, V represents the variation of consumers’ evaluation under individual pricing 
strategy. When V >0, it means the value of the information service package is greater than the 
summation of every information service’s value; if V <0, it means the summation of every 
information service’s value is not less than the value for bundling. The time 
consumers spending on service package is Nt, so the price paid to intermediaries is Ntpi, and the 
consumer surplus is CSb=NRE+V pe-pb-Ntpi. 
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Only when CSb > 0, the customers would purchase the information service, so; 
                                   
N
VpNtpp
R bieE


                                   (5) 
 
 
As a result, the demand for bundling pricing information service is: 
 
NR
VpNtpp
dxxfD bie
N
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     (6) 
 
 
3. Information Services Pricing of Providers Based on Stackelberg Game 
 
Under the circumstance of adopting different pricing models, in order to compare the difference 
of the information providers’ profits, according to the literature 9, we can know the priority price 
maker will get first mover advantage in the information services market. Therefore, we analyze 
the profits difference for the information providers in this paper, it is the first to carry out pricing 
decisions for information providers, that is to say the information providers know the response 
function of intermediaries, while the intermediaries don’t know the information provider’s 
response function. 
 
3.1. Information Providers Profit under the Individual pricing Strategy 
 
At this point, the profit function of the information providers is: 
 
)1(
R
tppp
NpDp icecccsc


                       (7) 
 
Because the intermediaries are charged fees based on the flow, in order to meet the demand, 
therefore the required time is written as Dct, then, the expected profit intermediaries obtained is: 
 
)1(
R
tppp
tNptDp iceiciic


                       (8) 
 
Mathematically, it can be seen the formula (7) is quadratic function against pc, formula (8) is also 
concave quadratic function against pi. In order to maximize sc andic, we should make 
first-order derivative against pc for formula (7) and first-order derivative against pi for formula (8). 
According to the derivative to formula (8), we know that the intermediaries’ response function of 
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the information providers is: 
 
t
ppR
p cei
2


                                            (9) 
 
 
Handling (9) into formula (7), we can know the profit function of the information providers is: 
 
 R
ppRNp cec
sc
2
)( 

                                    (10) 
 
Making formula (10) derivative against pc, we can obtain the optimal prices respectively are: 
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And then, the profit function of the information providers is: 
 
R
pRN e
sc
8
)( 2
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                                            (11) 
 
3.2. Information Providers’ Profit under the Bundling pricing Strategy  
  
So the profit function of the information providers is 
 
)1(
NR
VpNtpp
pDp biebbbsb


                 (12) 
 
At the same time, the profit function of the intermediaries is: 
 
)1(
NR
VpNtpp
NtpNtDp bieibiib


             (13) 
 
It is easy to see that formula (12) is concave to pb, formula (13) is concave to pi. In order to 
maximize the profit, we should make formula (12) first-order derivative against pb and formula 
(13) first-order derivative against pi. 
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According to the mentioned method, we obtain: 
 
Nt
VppNR
p bei
2


                                    (14) 
 
Substituting (15) into formula (13):  
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                               (15) 
 
Making derivative against pc for formula (15), we can obtain the optimal prices are: 
 
2
VpNR
p eb


, Nt
VpNR
p ei
4


 
 
At this point, the profit function of the information providers is:  
 
                    NR
VpNR e
sb
8
)( 2

                                         (16) 
 
4. Results Analysis and Numerical Simulation  
 
4.1. Results Analysis 
 
Through the above analysis, we can find that the information providers adopt which kind of 
pricing methods depend on the relationship between bc and zero in formula  
 
  
NR
VpNNRVpN
R
pRN
NR
VpNR eeee
bc
8
)1(2)1(
8
)(
8
)( 22 





         (17) 
 
When we consider the price of the sensor device pe changing, while other variables are constant, 
making bc equal to 0, so,  
 
PROPOSITION1. When the cost satisfies R>pe>min[pe1,pe2], bundling pricing strategy is always 
better than individual pricing strategy. If pe=min[pe1,pe2], there is no difference between 
individual pricing strategy and bundling pricing strategy, while 0<pe<min[pe1,pe2], individual 
pricing strategy is better than bundling pricing strategy.  
 
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management – http://dx.doi.org/10.3926/jiem.619 
 
 
- 184 - 
 
When V>0, obviously, we can get bc>0 from formula (17), that is to say at this point individual 
pricing strategy is better than bundling pricing strategy for the information providers. If 
0>V >-R(N-1), pe2>pe1, while 
2
2 ( 1)
1
e
NR R N
p R
N
  
    , the upper limit of C is R, when 0<pe<pe1, 
then bundling pricing strategy is poorer than individual pricing strategy for the 
information providers. When it satisfies pe1<pe<R, we could drop that the individual pricing 
strategy is not better than the bundling pricing strategy. While –RN<V<-R(N-1), pe2<pe1, 
1
1


N
RN
pR e
, so the upper limit of pe is R, when 0<pe<pe2, the profit from bundling pricing 
strategy is inferior to the profit from individual pricing strategy. When pe2<pe<R, the individual 
pricing strategy is not better than bundling pricing strategy. That means when the 
information providers make price decisions for information services in reality, they should 
consider the impact of the sensor device’s price on pricing method, if the sensor device’s price pe 
satisfies R>pe>min[pe1, pe2], they should adopt bundling pricing strategy, otherwise, they should 
adopt individual pricing strategy. 
 
Assuming that the variation of consumers’ perception value of information services V changes, 
other variables are constant, making bc equal to 0, we can get V1=-(N-1)pe<0, for the 
equationV2-V1=2N(pe-R)<0, so there is V2<0. 
 
PROPOSITION2: when the variation of consumers’ perception value of information 
servicesV>V1, the information providers should take bundling pricing strategy; 
ifV2<V<V1, individual pricing strategy is better than bundling pricing strategy; whileV<V2, 
information providers should consider the sensor equipment pricing range to determine which 
kind of pricing strategies is adopted, if individual pricing strategy is better than 
bundling pricing strategy; while 1

N
NR
pR e
, information producers should adopt bundling 
pricing strategy, this strengthens the conclusion when we consider the sensor device price pe 
changes.  
If there is , for V2+NR=(N+1)pe-NR<0, lower limit of consumers’ retention effect is 0. 
WhenV>V1, the bundling pricing strategy is better than individual pricing strategy for the 
information providers, if there is V<V1, bundling pricing strategy is not better than individual 
pricing strategy. When 1

N
NR
pR e , no matter V>V1 orV<V2, the information providers 
should adopt bundling pricing strategy, but not individual pricing strategy in the IOT market. 
WhileV2<V<V1, bundling pricing strategy is worse than individual pricing strategy. This 
suggests when the information providers make price for information services in the IOT, they 
should adopt bundling pricing strategy for customers whose variation of perception value of 
information services is large; if the information providers want to take individual pricing strategy, 
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the variation of customers evaluation toward information services should satisfy certain 
conditions. When the variation of customers’ perception value of information services is small, 
which pricing strategy should be adopted depends on the sensor device price range. 
 
4.2. Numerical Simulation 
 
In view of the fact that the market of the IOT is in the preliminary developing stage now, market 
share is relatively smaller compared with other markets. What’s more, its associated data is not 
easy to find. Therefore, this paper uses numerical simulation to verify the above conclusions. So 
we assume that the service package contain N=6 pieces of information services, in the ideal case, 
the consumers’ evaluation value of the information services is R=42, the interval of the price pe 
of the sensor device is [15 41], the interval of the variation of consumers’ perception value of 
information services V is [-250 10]. According to these figures and the above solution 
procedures, the information providers adopt bundling pricing strategy or individual pricing 
strategy respectively; the profits are shown in Figure 2, 3.  
 
 
Figure 2. Profit sb with bundling pricing strategy 
 
 
Figure 3. Profitsc with individual pricing strategy 
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From figure 2 and figure 3, we can see that when information providers adopt individual pricing 
strategy, the profit is only related to the sensor device price , but not related to the variation of 
consumers’ perception value of information services, while they take bundling pricing strategy, 
the profit of information providers is related to the both. On the other hand, compared with the 
second group, the third, the fourth, the fifth, the seventh and the eighth group，we can obtain that 
when the variation of perception value of information services is the same, if the sensor device 
price is large, the information providers should adopt bundling pricing strategy, otherwise, they 
take individual pricing strategy. From the third group, the fourth group, the sixth, the seventh, 
the eighth, the ninth and the tenth group，we can obtain that when the sensor device price is the 
same, if the variation of perception value of information services is large, bundling pricing 
strategy should be adopted, but if it exceeds a certain minimum value, which strategy should be 
taken depends on the range of the sensor device price. The simulation results are entirely 
consistent with the conclusions in this article, that is to say the model is right. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
This paper researches the information providers should take different strategies based on the 
specific situations to maximize the profit on the information service market of the IOT. When 
the providers make price for the information service, in addition to continuously improve the 
quality of information service, it also devotes resources to tapping and understanding market 
information, such as the sensor device price, the variation of perception value of 
information services and so on, so as to create competitive advantage. This paper is just a 
preliminary model, it does not take into account the effect of mixed bundling, the author will 
make further research on this direction. 
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